Many multi-product …rms incur a complexity …xed cost when o¤ering di¤erent product lines in di¤erent quality tiers relative to the case when o¤ering all products lines in the same quality tier (high or low). Such …xed costs create an interdependency between …rms' choices of quality tiers across di¤erent product lines, even when demands are independent. We investigate the e¤ects of this interdependency on equilibrium pro…ts in a Stackelberg duopoly game. Both …rms'pro…ts are (weakly) higher when the complexity cost is in…nite than when it is 0. The Stackelberg leader's pro…ts are always (weakly) higher with a positive complexity …xed cost, but its pro…ts can be nonmonotonic in the magnitude of this cost. The Stackelberg follower's pro…ts can be lower when the complexity …xed cost is positive than when it is equal to 0.
Introduction
In many industries, multi-product …rms do not have full ‡exibility to choose di¤erent quality tiers for di¤erent product categories (lines). Once committed to a certain quality tier (high or low) in one product line, it is usually more costly to o¤er another product line in a di¤erent quality tier instead of o¤ering it in the same tier. This is one of the main reasons for which many multi-product …rms in various industries typically o¤er a consistent product and service quality for most of their product categories. Examples include retailers (e.g. Neiman Marcus, Saks Fifth Avenue at the highend vs. T.J. Maxx, Wal-Mart at the low-end), e-commerce (e.g. Eastbay and Zappos selling shoes and clothing with a high level of customer service vs. eBay relying on third-party sellers with typically lower-quality service), furniture stores (e.g. Crate & Barrel at the mid-to high-end vs. Ikea at University of North Carolina, gbiglais@email.unc.edu y Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, E-mail: ahagiu@hbs.edu the low-end), airlines (full-price carriers such as American Airlines, Emirates, United vs. low-cost carriers such as EasyJet, Ryan Air, Southwest), etc. Some companies have managed to maintain di¤erent quality tiers for di¤erent product lines, e.g. Sears (low-end in clothing, but lower-upper end in tools), Amazon (retailer with high level of service on some products, but eBay-like marketplace on other products), Singapore Airlines (high-end airline, but also operates Scoot, a low-cost carrier, on some, typically shorter, routes). 1 However, other companies'attempts to do so have failed, e.g. J.C.
Penney's unsuccessful attempt to become an upscale department store between 2011-2013, 2 the failure of Delta's low-cost carrier Song, 3 etc. These examples illustrate that in many circumstances there are diseconomies of scope when o¤ering multiple quality tiers on di¤erent product lines or categories. Such diseconomies can stem from a combination of brand stickiness -it is di¢ cult to cover multiple quality tiers with the same brand or operate multiple brands in the same organization -and operational complexity -di¤erent quality tiers have di¤erent internal processes (see Rivkin, 2006) .
We analyze a Stackelberg multi-product duopoly game in which …rms incur a higher …xed cost when o¤ering di¤erent product lines in di¤erent quality tiers (mixed mode) than when o¤ering all product lines in the same quality tier (high or low). To the best of our knowledge, this type of interdependence has not been analyzed in the previous literature on multi-product oligopoly, despite its real-world relevance. In our model, each …rm can o¤er any subset of a given range of products that have identical and independent demands. Each product can be o¤ered in one of two qualities (or modes) -high or low -and a …rm that o¤ers positive numbers of products in each mode incurs a …xed complexity cost F 0. Firms compete product-by-product, so the only inter-dependence across products is driven by costs, not by demand.
We …rst show that both …rms' pro…ts are higher when the complexity cost is in…nite (i.e. each …rm must o¤er all of its products in the same mode) than when the complexity …xed cost is 0 (i.e. …rms can costlessly use a mixed mode). Indeed, the inability to o¤er di¤erent products in di¤erent modes makes it easier for …rms to sustain di¤erentiation with respect to the o¤ered products, so that each …rm ends up being a monopolist on the products it o¤ers. In contrast, when …rms can use a mixed mode costlessly, the choices of mode (high or low) for individual products are independent of one another, so …rms cannot avoid competing on each product as a vertical di¤erentiated duopoly.
The determination of the equilibrium is more complex when the …xed cost is positive but …nite.
The Stackelberg leader's (…rm 1's) pro…ts are higher for all F > 0 than for F = 0, but they can be non-monotonic in F . The reason is that the …xed complexity cost can have two opposing e¤ects on …rm 1's pro…ts: i) a direct, negative e¤ect when …rm 1 chooses a mixed mode strategy (i.e. o¤ers some products in each mode), and ii) an indirect, positive e¤ect, by lowering the pro…ts that the Stackelberg follower (…rm 2) can achieve with a mixed mode, thereby relaxing the constraints on …rm 1. On the other hand, the Stackelberg follower's pro…ts can be lower when the complexity cost is positive and 1 …nite than when it is equal to 0. Furthermore, consumer surplus is higher when the …rms can freely o¤er products in multiple modes, since consumer surplus is higher in a di¤erentiated duopoly than in a single quality monopoly market.
In most of the literature on multi-product monopoly and duopoly (e.g. Mussa and Rosen 1978 , Gal-Or 1983 , Champsaur and Rochet 1989 , Klemperer 1992 , and Johnson and Myatt 2003 , the …xed costs of o¤ering an additional quality version or product line are typically 0 (marginal costs are, however, allowed to depend on product quality). In contrast, the key feature of our model is the interdependence of …rms'quality choices across product lines due to …xed costs. This type of interdependency has not previously been studied, despite its real-world relevance.
Furthermore, unlike most of the literature on multi-product monopoly and duopoly, which assumes all product lines are within the same product category and therefore substitutes, we focus on independent product lines. In other words, in our model consumer demand for each product line is independent of demand for the other product lines. Thus, we allow for two dimensions of di¤erentiation between …rms: vertical di¤erentiation within the same product line and product line di¤erentiation (i.e. …rms may o¤er di¤erent product lines). A prominent exception to the single product category assumption is Klemperer (1992) , which analyzes a circular Hotelling-type setting where duopolists are restricted to o¤ering N products at 0 …xed costs, but consumers have disutility from making purchases at multiple …rms (e.g. switching costs). The di¤erence is that in our model demands are independent across product lines, therefore our focus is on supply-side interdependencies, not on demand drivers as in Klemperer (1992) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the basic model: we use a reduced form set-up that encompasses a large set of demand functions. We treat the baseline cases with complexity cost equal to 0 and in…nity in section 3. This allows us to establish some basic intuition and de…ne two important strategies for the Stackelberg leader (full-spectrum and accommodation).
Section 4 contains the analysis for all …nite complexity cost. We analyze extensions in section 5 and conclude in the …nal section 6.
Model set-up
There are two competing …rms, 1 and 2. Each …rm i 2 f1; 2g can choose a continuous number of products N i 2 [0; N ] to o¤er and one of two possible modes, L or H, for each product (in section 5.2 we allow …rms to o¤er a product in both modes). Demands are identical and independent across products, i.e. competition occurs product by product. The two modes should be interpreted as corresponding to two vertically di¤erentiated versions: high and low intrinsic qualities of the product or high and low levels of service accompanying the product.
If one of the two …rms is a monopolist on any given product, its revenues net of marginal costs are 
We make the following two assumptions throughout.
Assumption 2 Demand for each product is such that a monopolist never …nds it pro…table to o¤ er the product in both modes.
The …rst assumption simply ensures consistency with the interpretation of two vertically di¤erentiated product versions: the H mode is more pro…table than the L mode, even accounting for …xed costs. The second assumption rules out price discrimination reasons for o¤ering multiple (vertically di¤erentiated) versions of the same productsuch price discrimination motivations are studied indepth by Johnson and Myatt (2003) . This assumption implies that throughout most of the analysis neither …rm has any incentive to o¤er any given product in both modes. The only exception is when a …rm wishes to foreclose the other …rm, a possibility we discuss in Section 5.2.
The following example satis…es both assumptions above. Consumers are indexed by v, uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. Consumer v's willingness-to-pay for a product of quality q is qv. The L mode corresponds to quality q L and the H mode corresponds to quality q H > q L . Assume 0 marginal costs.
With this demand structure, pro…ts are:
It is easily veri…ed that this example satis…es both assumptions for any (q H ; q L ), provided f H f L is not too large. 4 It is worth emphasizing that f L and f H do not play any signi…cant role in our analysis, which is why they are subsumed in the terms H , L , H and L . 4 Also, …xing qL, there exists q H > qL such that H < L for qL < qH < q H and H > L for qH > q H .
On the other hand, the key ingredient of our model will be the …xed cost associated with o¤ering products in both the H and L modes. To keep things as simple as possible, we assume that a …rm that o¤ers positive numbers of products in both modes incurs a "complexity …xed cost" F 0. In other words, this cost is incurred whenever a …rm does not o¤er all of its products in the same mode. 5 This …xed cost may correspond to the risk of confusing consumers by o¤ering two vertically di¤erentiated modes under the same brand or to the operational complexity of running two di¤erent business models.
The fundamental e¤ect of the complexity …xed cost is that it creates an interdependence between a …rm's choices of modes across products.
The timing of the duopoly game in all scenarios is as follows:
1. Firm 1 chooses the respective numbers of products to o¤er in each mode, N H 1 and N L 1 such that
2. Firm 2 chooses the respective numbers of products to o¤er in each mode, N H 2 and N L 2 such that
3. Firms simultaneously compete in prices product by product and pro…ts are realized.
Assuming the product selection stage precedes the pricing game is standard in the multi-product duopoly literature (see for example Champsaur and Rochet, 1989 ) and re ‡ects the fact that product selection is typically a long-run decision, whereas prices can be modi…ed more easily and frequently.
It is then natural to also assume that …rms choose their prices simultaneously.
There are two reasons for assuming Stackelberg timing in product selection. First, the Stackelberg timing re ‡ects realistic scenarios in which …rm 1 is an incumbent or industry leader, who makes product line choices …rst, whereas …rm 2 is an entrant or a follower. Second, from a methodological standpoint, Stackelberg timing provides a natural way of ensuring a unique pure strategy equilibrium.
In contrast, with Nash (simultaneous) timing, there will typically be multiple equilibria and sometimes there may only exist mixed strategy equilibria.
Baseline results
In this section, we derive the baseline results for two simple (and polar opposite) cases.
Suppose …rst that there is no complexity …xed cost associated with operating under both modes, i.e. F = 0. This means that each …rm's choices of modes are independent across products. In this case, the equilibrium is easily obtained.
Proposition 1 When …rms' choices of modes are independent across products, there is a unique equilibrium in which …rm 1 o¤ ers all N products in H mode and …rm 2 o¤ ers all N products in L mode. Equilibrium pro…ts are N H for …rm 1 and N L for …rm 2.
Not surprisingly, since choices of modes across products are independent, this is the same (unique) equilibrium that would prevail if there was only one product. Firms o¤er vertically di¤erentiated versions of each product, with …rm 1 choosing the more pro…table H mode and …rm 2 choosing the L mode.
At the opposite extreme, suppose now that each …rm must choose the same mode for all products it o¤ers. This corresponds to the case when the complexity …xed cost is prohibitively high, i.e. F ! 1.
In this case, each …rm chooses one of the two modes -H or L -and the number of products to o¤er in that mode. Thus, suppose …rm 1 has chosen the H mode in stage 1 and N 1 N products. Firm 2 has two options:
Choose the L mode: clearly Firm 2 will o¤er all products in L mode, since L > 0. Firm 2's equilibrium pro…ts are then
Choose the H mode: …rm 2 will only o¤er the N N 1 products not o¤ered by …rm 1. Firm 2's equilibrium pro…ts are then
Comparing, …rm 2 chooses the L mode if and only if
which can also be written as:
Thus, if the number of products o¤ered by …rm 1 in H mode is larger than the threshold N H , …rm 2 responds by competing on all products with a vertically di¤erentiated version. If, on the other hand, N 1 is below the threshold N H then …rm 2 …nds it pro…table to not compete on the products o¤ered by …rm 1, so that both …rms end up with H mode monopoly pro…ts on their respective products. The threshold is increasing in H and decreasing in L and L : the higher the monopoly H pro…ts and the lower L pro…ts (monopoly and duopoly), the easier it is to induce …rm 2 to be content with being an H monopolist on N N 1 products instead of o¤ering all products in L mode (which involves competing on the N 1 products o¤ered by …rm 1).
Stepping back to stage 1, …rm 1 pro…ts are
We conclude that when …rm 1 chooses the H mode, its optimal pro…ts are max fN H ; N H H g. In other words, …rm 1 has a choice between duopoly pro…ts on all relevant products and monopoly pro…ts on a subset of these products. Relegating the rest of the proof to the appendix, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When each …rm must o¤ er all products in the same mode, the duopoly equilibrium is as follows: Comparing Propositions 1 and 2 reveals that …rm 1 makes (weakly) higher pro…ts when …rms are constrained to o¤er all products under the same mode. In particular, pro…ts are strictly higher when H is su¢ ciently large relative to both L and H . Furthermore, …rm 2 also makes (weakly) higher pro…ts when F = +1. Indeed,
The intuition behind this result is that the inability to choose di¤erent modes for di¤erent products allows the …rms to also di¤erentiate with respect to the products they o¤er. This can be a more e¤ective form of di¤erentiation than the vertical di¤erentiation within each product, provided that monopoly H pro…ts are su¢ ciently large relative to monopoly and duopoly L pro…ts. Indeed, if monopoly L pro…ts are too close to monopoly H pro…ts, then …rm 1 cannot induce …rm 2 to o¤er a restricted number of H products instead of all products in L mode. Anticipating this, …rm 1 has no choice but to resign itself to duopoly H pro…ts on all products.
Finally, note that consumer welfare is strictly lower in the equilibrium in which …rm 1 o¤ers N 1 < N products in H mode and induces …rm 2 to o¤er the remaining products in H mode as well. In this equilibrium, all products are o¤ered, but each product is only o¤ered by a monopolist. By contrast, in the equilibrium in which …rm 1 o¤ers all N products in H mode, each products ends up being o¤ered by a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly, so consumer welfare is higher.
In what follows, we will refer to …rm 1's strategy of o¤ering all products in H mode as the "fullspectrum strategy" and to its strategy of only o¤ering a limited number of products in H mode (thereby inducing …rm 2 to only o¤er the other products in H mode) as the "accommodation strategy."
Equilibrium with …nite complexity …xed cost
In this section, we study the case in which …rms are not forced to use the same mode for all the products they o¤er, but they need to incur a …nite complexity …xed cost F > 0 if they o¤er positive numbers of products in each mode.
Denote:
The number N H (F ) 2 [0; N ] represents the maximum number of products that …rm 1 can o¤er in H mode such that …rm 2's best response is to only o¤er the remaining N N H (F ) products in H mode. The …rst term in the min fg operator (equal to N H (+1)) is the same as the threshold in Proposition 2. This term is the maximum number of products that …rm 1 can o¤er in H mode such that …rm 2 prefers o¤ering the remaining products in H mode as a monopolist to o¤ering all products in L mode. The second term is new and represents the maximum number N H of products that …rm 1 can o¤er in H mode such that …rm 2 is content to be a monopolist in mode H on the remaining N N H products and does not want to also compete in L mode on the N H products o¤ered by …rm 1 (this would yield additional pro…ts L N H at cost F ).
With this notation, the maximum pro…ts that …rm 1 can achieve with the accommodation strategy are N H (F ) H . As before, these pro…ts need to be compared with N H , the pro…ts resulting from the full-spectrum strategy, but now …rm 1 can also consider a mixed mode strategy, i.e. o¤ering some products in H mode and others in L mode. The following proposition (proven in the appendix), provides the full characterization of …rm 1's optimal strategy.
Proposition 3 When …rms incur a …xed complexity cost F > 0 for using a mixed mode, …rm 1 may o¤ er products in H mode only or in both modes, …rm 2 only o¤ ers products in a single mode and
Thus, when F is su¢ ciently small, …rm 1's optimal pro…ts (from (1)) are simply N H , i.e. the same as in Proposition 1 (F = 0). In this case, …rm 2's pro…ts are N L . Meanwhile, when F becomes large enough, the expression of …rm 1's optimal pro…ts (from (2) (1) and (2)) are simply the full-spectrum and accommodation strategy pro…ts. The third and fourth terms for both regions correspond to mixed mode strategies for …rm 1.
To understand the di¤erence between the two cases in the proposition, it is …rst useful to note that in any equilibrium …rm 1 precludes …rm 2 from using a mixed mode strategy. Indeed, if …rm 2 used a mixed mode strategy in equilibrium, then it would necessarily cover the entire product range, since it is already incurring the …xed cost F and adding an additional product yields at least L > 0. Denoting by N 2 the number of products o¤ered in H mode by …rm 2, we have 0 < N 2 < N . In this equilibrium, …rm 1's pro…ts would be N 2 L or (N N 2 ) H or N 2 L + (N N 2 ) H F . But each of these pro…ts are dominated by N H , the pro…t that …rm 1 can guarantee by choosing the full-spectrum strategy (all products in H mode).
As discussed before the proposition, the necessity of preventing …rm 2 from using a mixed mode strategy explains the new expression of N H (F ) in …rm 1's accommodation strategy. When …rm 1 uses the accommodation strategy, …rm 2's resulting pro…ts are (N N H (F )) H .
Focusing now on equilibria in which …rm 1 chooses a mixed mode strategy, the di¤erence between the two cases is whether or not the constraint of having to prevent …rm 2 from using a mixed mode is binding. In the …rst case ( F N < L H L + H ), the complexity …xed cost is su¢ ciently small, so …rm 1 needs to take into account that …rm 2 can pro…tably o¤er products in both modes. To prevent …rm 2 from doing so, the number N 1 of products that …rm 1 o¤ers in H mode must either be small enough so that …rm 2 does not want to o¤er those same products in L mode (N 1 L < F ), or large enough so that …rm 2 does not want to o¤er in H mode the same products that …rm 1 o¤ers in L mode ( H (N N 1 ) F ).
These two possibilities lead to the third and fourth terms in (1) . The corresponding …rm 2 pro…ts are N F L H when …rm 1 chooses the third option in (1) and N F H L when …rm 1 chooses the fourth option in (1) . In particular, note that when …rm 1 chooses the fourth option, …rm 2's pro…ts are strictly lower than N L , the pro…ts it makes when F = 0.
In the second case, ( F N > L H L + H ), the …xed cost incurred when adopting a mixed mode is su¢ ciently high that …rm 2 never chooses the mixed mode option in response to …rm 1 choosing the mixed mode strategy. Firm 1 still has two options with a mixed mode strategy:
Induce …rm 2 to only o¤er H products, speci…cally the N N 1 products that …rm 1 o¤ers in L mode. This leaves …rm 1 as an H-mode monopolist on N 1 products and an L-mode duopolist on N N 1 products (third term in (2)). Firm 2's pro…ts in this case are N H L L + H , strictly lower than N L , the pro…ts it makes when F = 0.
Induce …rm 2 to only o¤er L products, speci…cally the N 1 products that 1 o¤ers in H mode. This leaves …rm 1 as an H-mode duopolist on N 1 products and an L-mode monopolist on N N 1 products (fourth term in (2)). Firm 2's pro…ts in this case are once again N L H L + H .
It is interesting to discuss the e¤ect of the …xed cost F on …rm 1's equilibrium pro…ts. When F is not too large, it a¤ects …rm 1's pro…ts both directly and indirectly. The direct e¤ect is always negative: it reduces the pro…ts that …rm 1 can obtain with a mixed-mode strategy. In contrast, the indirect e¤ect is positive: a larger F reduces …rm 2's pro…ts from using a mixed mode, which in turn relaxes the constraints faced by …rm 1 and therefore enhances (weakly) its pro…ts. The negative direct e¤ect only comes into play when …rm 1 uses a mixed-mode strategy, but for such a strategy to be dominant, it is necessary that the positive indirect e¤ect of F on …rm 1's pro…ts outweighs the negative direct e¤ect. Thus, …rm 1's pro…ts are weakly increasing in F in this parameter range.
Consider now the case when F is above the threshold N L H L + H . If …rm 1 chooses the accommodation strategy then its pro…ts are weakly increasing in F because F only a¤ects …rm 1's pro…ts indirectly: a larger F relaxes the constraint of having to prevent …rm 2 from using a mixed mode. On the other hand, if …rm 1 chooses either one of the two mixed-mode strategies then F only has the direct negative e¤ect on its equilibrium pro…ts since …rm 2 would never consider choosing a mixed mode in this case. This is why the overall e¤ect of F on …rm 1's pro…ts is ambiguous on this parameter range. 
Equilibrium with capability …xed costs
An alternative way to introduce interdependence between a …rm's choices of modes across products lines through …xed costs is to assume that each mode requires a …xed "capability" investment, instead of the complexity …xed cost studied above. Speci…cally, suppose that o¤ering any positive number of products in H mode requires a …xed cost F H 0 and o¤ering any positive number of products in L mode requires a …xed cost F L 0. We still maintain the assumption that the …rm can only o¤er one mode per product. Consistent with the interpretation of vertical di¤erentiation (H corresponds to the higher quality mode), we assume the …xed cost required for the H capability is larger than the …xed cost required for the L capability:
Furthermore, we also assume that …xed costs are not too high, such that both modes are viable for a monopolist as a well as for a duopolist:
The expression of N H is very similar to N H (F ) from section 4 and has the same meaning: it is the maximum number of products that …rm 1 can o¤er in H mode such that …rm 2's best response is to only o¤er the remaining N N H products in H mode (accommodation strategy). Similarly, N L represents the maximum number of products that …rm 1 can o¤er in L mode such that …rm 2's best response is to only o¤er the remaining N N L products in L mode. Note that N L 0 in all cases.
In the appendix, we derive the full equilibrium summarized in the following proposition. 
If F L L + F H H > N then …rm 1's optimal pro…ts are max 8 > < > :
The …rst two terms for both cases are the full-spectrum strategy pro…ts. The di¤erence with respect to Proposition 3 is that now …rm 1 may …nd it pro…table to o¤er the full spectrum of products under either the H mode or the L mode, depending on which option yields higher revenues net of …xed costs (in Proposition 3, the full-spectrum strategy in H mode always dominated the full spectrum strategy in L mode). The third and fourth terms in both (3) and (4) are the accommodation strategy pro…ts.
Once again, the di¤erence with respect to Proposition 3 is that either the H or the L mode may be optimal for the accommodation strategy.
When F L L + F H H < N , the …fth and sixth terms in (3) correspond to mixed mode strategies for …rm 1 and they are almost identical to the corresponding terms in Proposition 3 (save for the di¤erence in the …xed cost structure). Their interpretation is the same: …rm 1 needs to take into account that …rm 2 can pro…tably enter with a mixed strategy. To prevent this, …rm 1 must o¤er a number N 1 of products in H mode that is either small enough so that …rm 2 does not want to o¤er those same products in L mode (N 1 L < F L ) or large enough so that …rm 2 does not want to o¤er in H mode the products that …rm 1 o¤ers in L mode ((N N 1 ) H < F H ).
When F L L + F H H > N , …rm 1 can foreclose …rm 2 with a mixed mode strategy that denies …rm 2 viable scale in both modes -a novel possibility relative to Proposition 3. Speci…cally, …rm 1 can o¤er N 1 = F L L products in H mode and N N 1 < F H H in L mode: as a result, …rm 2 cannot make positive pro…ts in either mode ( L N 1 = F L and H (N N 1 ) < F H ). Furthermore, it turns out that the pro…ts that …rm 1 can obtain with this foreclosure strategy dominate the maximum pro…ts it can obtain with any other mixed strategy that allows …rm 2 to enter. This is why in this case the only options to consider for …rm 1 are full-spectrum, accommodation and foreclosure (…fth term in (4)).
Foreclosure
Throughout the previous analysis, we have assumed that neither …rm can o¤er a product in both modes. Assumption 2 guarantees that …rm 2 never has an incentive to do so. On the other hand, …rm 1 may …nd it pro…table to o¤er a product in both modes, but only if it leads to foreclosure of …rm 2. Consider the main model above with …xed complexity costs F . Allowing …rm 1 to foreclose simply amounts to adding a …fth option to the ones described in the text of Proposition 3. Foreclosure yields pro…ts for …rm 1 equal to
Indeed, this dominates any strategy in which …rm 1 would only o¤er a subset n < N products in both modes. To see why, note that assumption 2 implies that R H r H + r L , which together with r L > f L (assumption 1) leads to H f L > H . This means that the highest pro…ts …rm 1 can hope to achieve by only o¤ering n < N products in both modes are
Thus, …rm 1's optimal pro…ts from Proposition 3 become
It is clear from these expressions that foreclosure is not necessarily optimal, so most of the analysis in section 4 remains valid. Note that foreclosure is more likely when both f L and F are smaller.
Conclusion
Many multi-product …rms incur additional …xed costs when attempting to o¤er di¤erent products in di¤erent quality or service tiers. These costs are usually associated with brand confusion or the necessity of maintaining di¤erent brands, as well as with the operational complexity (diseconomies of scope) of running di¤erent business models under the same organization. Such complexity …xed costs create interdependencies in …rms'choices of quality or service tiers across di¤erent product lines.
We have shown that these cost-driven interdependencies create interesting and novel e¤ects on the equilibria that arise in a Stackelberg duopoly model. The Stackelberg leader always bene…ts from positive complexity …xed costs (relative to the case with no complexity costs), but its pro…ts can be non-monotonic in the magnitude of the complexity costs. In contrast, the Stackelberg follower's pro…ts can be lower when complexity …xed costs are positive and …nite, although they are (weakly) higher when the complexity …xed cost is in…nite (i.e. when each …rm must choose a single quality tier for all of the products it o¤ers).
There are several promising avenues for extending our analysis. First, one could investigate the impact of complexity …xed costs on …rm pro…ts in the scenario when consumers incur switching costs between …rms, so they prefer buying all products from the same …rm (in our analysis above, consumer demands are independent across products). Second, one could introduce heterogeneity in product demands and investigate whether the Stackelberg leader would always o¤er the most pro…table products or sometimes prefer to accommodate the follower by leaving some pro…table products out of its line-up in order to reduce the follower's incentives to compete with the leader. 
which can also be written:
Stepping back to stage 1, …rm 1 pro…ts are N 1 H if N 1 N H and N 1 H if N 1 > N H . We conclude that when …rm 1 chooses the H mode, its optimal pro…ts are max fN H ; N H H g.
Suppose now …rm 1 chooses the L mode and o¤ers N 1 N products. Again, …rm 2 has two options:
choose the H mode, in which case it is optimal to o¤er all N products, leading to pro…ts
choose the L mode, in which case it is optimal to only o¤er the N N 1 products not o¤ered by …rm 1, leading to pro…ts (N N 1 ) L Clearly, …rm 2 always prefers the …rst option (recall H > L ) so …rm 1's pro…ts are N 1 L . But these pro…ts are always smaller than what …rm 1 can obtain by o¤ering all products in the H mode (at least N H ).
We can therefore conclude that …rm 1 always chooses the H mode in equilibrium, earning pro…ts max fN H ; N H H g. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Firm 1 has three options: o¤er only H products, o¤er only L products or o¤er products in both modes. Let us examine each of these options in turn.
Option 1: …rm 1 o¤ers N 1 products in H mode, 0 < N 1 N Firm 2 has three options in response:
O¤er H products only, in which case it is optimal to o¤er all N N 1 products not o¤ered by …rm 1 in H mode. This yields pro…ts (N N 1 ) H for …rm 2 and N 1 H for …rm 1.
O¤er L products only, in which case it is optimal to o¤er all products in L mode. This yields pro…ts (N N 1 ) L + N 1 L for …rm 2 and N 1 H for …rm 1.
O¤er products in both modes, in which case it is optimal to o¤er all N N 1 products not o¤ered by …rm 1 in H mode and the N 1 products o¤ered by …rm 1 in L mode. This yields pro…ts (N N 1 ) H +N 1 L F for …rm 2 and N 1 H for …rm 1.
If …rm 2 chooses one of the last two options, then this can be part of an equilibrium for …rm 1 only if N 1 = N , resulting in pro…ts N H . Thus, the only way in which N 1 < N can be optimal for …rm 1 is for …rm 2 to prefer the …rst option over the other two. In this case, …rm 1 chooses the largest N 1 such that (N N 1 ) ( H L ) N 1 L and N 1 L F , i.e.
Thus, the best pro…ts that …rm 1 can achieve with this option (products in H mode only) are max fN H ; N H (F ) H g Option 2: …rm 1 o¤ers N 1 products in L mode, 0 < N 1 N Firm 2 has the following three options in response:
O¤er H products only, in which case it is optimal to o¤er all N products in H mode. This yields pro…ts (N N 1 ) H + N 1 H for …rm 2 and N 1 L for …rm 1.
O¤er L products only, in which case it is optimal to o¤er all N N 1 products not o¤ered by …rm 1 in L mode. This yields pro…ts (N N 1 ) L for …rm 2.
O¤er products in both modes, in which case it is optimal to o¤er all N N 1 products not o¤ered by …rm 1 in L mode and the N 1 products o¤ered by …rm 1 in H mode. This yields pro…ts (N N 1 ) L +N 1 H F for …rm 2.
It is immediately clear that …rm 2 always prefers the …rst option, which means that the maximum pro…t that …rm 1 can achieve in this scenario is N L . But this is dominated by the …rst option above: o¤ering all products in H mode guarantees pro…ts N H > N L . Therefore, this option will never be chosen by …rm 1 in equilibrium.
Option 3: …rm 1 o¤ers N 1 products in H mode and N N 1 products in L mode,
Indeed, it would be a dominated strategy for …rm 1 to o¤er products in both modes without covering the entire available product range.
Firm 2 has the following three options in response:
O¤er H products only, in which case it is optimal to o¤er only the N N 1 products that …rm 1 o¤ers in L mode. This yields pro…ts (N N 1 ) H for …rm 2 and N 1 H + (N N 1 ) L F for …rm 1.
O¤er L products only, in which case it is optimal to o¤er all N 1 products that …rm 1 o¤ers in H mode.
This yields pro…ts N 1 L for …rm 2 and N 1 H + (N N 1 ) L F for …rm 1.
O¤er products in both modes, in which case it is optimal to o¤er each product in the other mode relative to …rm 1. This yields pro…ts N 1 L + (N N 1 ) H F for …rm 2 and N 1 H + (N N 1 ) L F for …rm 1. Note that the second option yields positive pro…ts for …rm 2 (recall N L > F L ), so …rm 1 cannot foreclose …rm 2 with a pure H strategy. For this to be an equilibrium with N 1 < N , …rm 2 must prefer the …rst option above, i.e. we must have
If N 1 > N H then …rm 1 is better o¤ o¤ering all N products in H mode.
Thus, the highest pro…ts that …rm 1 can obtain with a pure H strategy are max fN H ; N H H g F H .
Suppose next …rm 1 chooses the pure L mode, with N 1 N products o¤ered in L mode. Then …rm 2's best three options in response are: pure H mode, yielding N 1 H + (N N 1 ) H F H for …rm 2 and N 1 L F L for …rm 1 pure L mode, yielding (N N 1 ) L F L for …rm 2 and N 1 L F L for …rm 1 hybrid HL mode, yielding N 1 H + (N N 1 ) L F L F H for …rm 2 and N 1 L F L for …rm 1
Clearly, the third option is always dominated by the …rst option for …rm 2, so …rm 2 chooses the best among the …rst two options. For this to be an equilibrium with N 1 < N , …rm 2 must prefer the second option above,
i.e. we must have
Given that N H > F H , it can be veri…ed that this inequality can only be satis…ed if F H F L N ( H L ) > 0, in which case it is equivalent to
Thus, the highest pro…ts that …rm 1 can obtain with a pure L strategy are max fN L ; N L L g F L , where It is easily veri…ed that the foreclosure pro…ts dominate both of these possibilities, so foreclosure is the optimal strategy for …rm 1 when it is feasible, i.e. when N 
